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n May 29, 2015, The Wall Street Journal reported that "the demand to own private shares in Snapchat, Inc. has become so fierce that its newest investors (including Alibaba Group Holdings) are willing to receive second-rate stock in exchange for their money."
1 The security position was considered second-rate because it came in the form of common equity rather than preferred stock, which provides investors with stronger rights than those afforded common shareholders. The funding round was raised at a post-money valuation (that is, the pre-funding value of the firm plus the newly invested capital) of $16 billion, which represented a 60% increase from the company's prior round, which was also raised through the issuance of common stock. By September 2015, however, capital market conditions had worsened, forcing Fidelity Investments, another common stockholder of Snapchat shares, to write down its investment by 25% amid concerns about the inflated valuations of private companies.
2 By contrast, earlier-stage providers of financial capital, such as Benchmark and Institutional Venture Partners, had invested in preferred stock, which was specifically designed to protect them against adverse market events.
In a recent article in this journal, we documented the dramatic increase in private IPO transactions (PIPOs) and the "unicorns"-privately held companies with market valuations of $1.0 billion or more-that such transactions have helped to create. 3 As we discussed, a primary benefit of PIPOs is that they allow companies to remain private longer, which may permit them to avoid the organizational and governance problems that are said to be endemic to publicly traded companies. But by keeping companies private longer, these PIPO transactions may also have the potential to reduce the value of these private companies by shielding them from the disciplining oversight imposed by a broader base of institutional and individual investors, financial analysts, and government agencies. In addition, achieving unicorn status is now considered to be such an important event for many market participants-if only for the public relations, marketing, and recruiting benefits the moniker is perceived to bestow-that companies appear to be pursuing it as a goal in itself. In fact, we showed that more than one-quarter (38 out of 142) of the unicorn firms in our sample were valued at exactly $1 billion, suggesting valuation outcomes that were likely manufactured to clear that specific hurdle.
In our analysis, we sounded a cautionary note with respect to this aspect of the rapidly evolving PIPO funding process. In particular, we suggested that in their quest to reach unicorn status, managers at some companies may have the incentive (or otherwise feel pressured) to manipulate the market valuation by acquiescing to complicated and onerous financing conditions that enable them to attract a sufficient amount of new capital. These complex contracting terms, which include such devices as ratchet agreements and preference payments, are invariably imposed as a way to eliminate most or all of the new investor's downside exposure to subsequent market price movements. However, this protection provided to new investors can come at the expense of materially negative effects that get shifted to other stakeholders-existing investors, entrepreneurs, and employees-who may not even know the terms exist or fully understand the impact of the stipulations on any benefits they may receive in the event that the company eventually becomes successful. In addition, in exchange for receiving terms that eliminate much of their downside risk, the participants in this new funding round may be willing to accept higher valuations than would be justified by the fundamental economic activity of the firm. Indeed, Bill Gurley, Managing Partner at Benchmark, offered a blunt assessment of this current state of affairs, stating that "all these private valuations are fake." 4 Of course, inflated valuations in the present increase the risk that future capital-raising efforts will be transacted at valuation levels that are lower than those obtained in previous funding rounds. And such "down rounds" can have negative consequences that go well beyond the immediate perception that the present worth of the company has declined. For example, the execution of a down round can trigger anti-dilution provisions by Keith C. Brown and Kenneth W. Wiles, University of Texas, McCombs School of Business* stage financial contracting arrangements commonly employed in the VC industry, we turn our attention to an extended numerical analysis in which we describe some representative components of a transaction term sheet in order to analyze how those terms limit or increase investor risk, and affect the incentives of management and investors by determining the payouts provided to entrepreneurs, managers, and the employees of the firm. As we argue in these pages, such division of risks and rewards, and their effects on incentives, can end up having material impacts on the ultimate success or failure of the company. More specifically, we show how, when, and where contracting provisions in these transactions can become confusing and dilutive, especially to a company's entrepreneurs and early-stage investors. 
Opaque Contracting and Toxic Terms: A Cautionary Case Study
The Financial Times recently noted that the financial services firm Square, Inc. ("Square") was preparing to launch an initial public offering (IPO) for its common stock at a valuation of about $6 billion. While this might ordinarily seem like good news, the problem the firm faced was that its last private round of financing in October 2014-its Series E roundwas done at a valuation of approximately $9 billion, making its IPO value about one-third less than that implied by the Series E funding. 8 The article also reported that employees were issued stock options in September 2015 with an exercise price of $15.39 per share, but that by November 2015 the options were already out of the money given the current anticipated share price of $12.00, which was the mid-point of its estimated IPO pricing range of $11.00-$13.00.
Complicating the situation further, Square's S-1 registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission revealed that investors in the most recent private funding round had negotiated a form of price protection known as a ratchet, which adjusts the conversion ratio from preferred stock to common stock and provides additional shares to the investor if certain pricing benchmarks in the IPO are not achieved. In Square's case, those benchmarks were not met and so the Series E investors, who had paid $15.46 per share for 9.7 million Series E preferred shares, were guaranteed that they would receive additional ownership interests in the event that the ultimate IPO share price settled below $18.56. Thus, the ratchet term effectively guaranteed Series E investors with a return of at least a 20%. 9 for some investors that can materially reduce the equity stakes of the other investors, or of the management or employees of the firm who do not have such protections.
5 This possibility can be especially demoralizing for employees, who are unlikely to know or understand the deal terms upon which their company's private investments were made in the first place.
Complex and non-transparent financing terms for privately held companies can lead not only to inflated valuations but to complications of a firm's efforts to raise additional capital, simply by creating more complex capitalization tables that can discourage future investors. Further, potential investors in subsequent funding rounds will almost certainly pressure the firm to offer them similar or even more favorable terms than those provided earlier investors, to the extent that they understand what those agreements entailed in the first place. Beyond that, potential future investors may also attempt to require that prior investors relinquish any beneficial stipulations they had negotiated in their funding rounds as a prerequisite for committing new capital.
But as already noted, the use of such investment roundspecific contracting terms-and the capital structure complexity they bring with them-may be the most cost-effective way for the firm to raise not just the next round of capital, but the entire series of offerings (at least as anticipated at that point in time). For as long as the value of the new venture continues to increase (or does not fall significantly), the downside protections will have limited negative economic impact while helping the company to raise capital by addressing prospective investors' uncertainty about the risk of the enterprise.
6 But this also means that a thorough understanding of the set of conditions and tradeoffs that become increasingly complex with each new round in a sequential funding scheme is essential for stakeholders in the firm to arrive at an optimal contracting solution. And, as we will see, this is often very difficult to accomplish.
Our goal in this study is to examine the economic consequences that result from the contracting terms commonly negotiated in venture capital ("VC") deals, as reflected in term sheets arranged between prospective investors and the company's board of directors, management, and prior investors. We will argue that some of these financial contracting provisions are both poorly understood (we use the term "opaque") by at least some of the participants as well as potentially value-destroying ("toxic") in the sense that they may result in wealth transfers or other conflicts among stakeholders that end up reducing the long-run value of the enterprise. After discussing the multi-10. Square is not alone in providing IPO price protection to investors. A recent study showed that 30% of the U.S venture-backed companies that had raised capital at valuations greater than $1 billion provided some type of IPO ratchet terms; see Barry Kramer, Michael Patrick, and Nicole Harper, 2015 , "The Terms Behind the Unicorn Valuations," Fenwick West LLP Working Paper, March 31.
11. Specifically, Goldman, Sachs & Co., was the lead underwriter, with Morgan Stanley and J.P. Morgan serving as co-managers of the deal.
12. Square, Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement, November 6, 2015. 13. One of the authors was the CFO of a company that raised a Series B round of capital at price lower than the Series A round. The company's capital structure included a convertible bridge loan that had a ratchet provision, warrants that had a separate ratchet, and Series A preferred stock that had a ratchet that was different from the other two. The CFO, the lead investor in the Series A funding, and the firm's investment bank all developed capitalization tables to reflect the impact of the multiple ratchets triggered by the down round of financing. After nearly a month of discussions, an agreement was reached on a table that captured the specific impact on the ownership of the company's founders. Prior to the Series B round, the company's CEO/founder owned more than 35.0% of the company; after the round, he owned just 0.7%. that obscure the value of their common shares. This in turn leads to a divergence between the reported private company valuations and the fundamental economic values of those firms. Private company valuations are usually based on the assumption that all investors will receive the same investment contracting terms and thus will receive the same economic value per share upon a successful exit, either by sale to another private equity firm or by IPO. However, in nearly all private companies, the contracting terms upon which the various classes of investors purchase their equity positions differ materially from one another, as will the economic values per share that accrue to those various ownership interests. Early-stage common stockholders, such as the founders or employees who have received option-based compensation, may find that their economic benefits are significantly lower than originally forecasted as a result of the downside protections often granted preferred shareholders in subsequent funding rounds.
Stated more plainly, the beneficial contracting terms afforded certain classes of investors transfer value from those who do not receive them to those investors who did. In the case of Square, common stockholders and other preferred investors who did not have ratchet protection suffered an economic loss as their positions were diluted to accommodate the ratchet provided to the Series E investors. The Series E investors, therefore, may well have been willing to pay a higher price for their shares knowing that they had a guaranteed 20% return, while the unprotected investors quite likely did not fully appreciate the diminution in value that accompanied that guarantee.
Different contracting terms can also lead to conflicts among investor groups or between investors and company management. For instance, because their ratchet provides a return guarantee, investors in Square's Series E round may be willing-eager, in fact-to sell the company for considerably less than the anticipated $6 billion IPO value, despite the impact that such a sale would have on the other stakeholders. Indeed, in this case, the lower the sales price, the greater the transfer of wealth to the Series E investors from other holders of common stock or common stock equivalents, such as convertible securities or warrants.
13

Venture Capital Contracting: Theory and Evidence
In an insightful discussion of financial contracting in the VC market published almost 30 years ago, William Sahlman observed that the ultimate goal of the arrangement between Square eventually went public on November 19, 2015 at an IPO price of $9.00 and closed the trading day with a share price of $13.07. The initial price was well below the $11.00-$13.00 anticipated range and triggered a ratchet payment of 10.3 million shares, or approximately 3% of the company's outstanding stock, with an IPO valuation of $92.3 million. Based on the first day's closing price, however, the ratchet ultimately provided an additional $134.6 million to the Series E investors on their initial investment of $150 million, resulting in a return of approximately 90% in slightly more than a year. 10 Interestingly, J.P. Morgan was one of the Series E investors as well as one of the main underwriters in the initial public offering.
11 In accordance with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Inc. Rule 5121, J.P. Morgan was therefore deemed to have a conflict of interest, which required another investment bank-in this case, Morgan Stanley-to act as a "qualified independent underwriter" in the preparation of the registration statement and prospectus.
12 Square would, of course, want to maximize the proceeds from its initial public launch. However, as a result of the IPO protection in its investment contract, J.P. Morgan could benefit more from a decline in the IPO price than it would lose from the drop in underwriting fees it would receive due to a lowered total offering amount. Clearly, this contractual arrangement created a direct conflict between J.P. Morgan and Square. Beyond, that, J.P. Morgan could also be in conflict with other underwriters, such as Goldman Sachs, that had made investments in Square but did not have the IPO price protection. Once again, J.P. Morgan could benefit more from an offering price reduction, while other underwriters would incur lower underwriting fees with no offsetting benefit.
The additional shares issued to the Series E investors, and the value that accrues to them, ultimately diluted the ownership position of those who do not have similar protections, a group that includes earlier-stage investors and Square employees who have received direct stock options or other types of equity-based incentive compensation. Unlike Fidelity Investments, which did not have downside protection for its Snapchat common stock position discussed earlier, the Series E investors in Square did not suffer any loss in value, and actually received additional financial benefits, even though the firm's IPO price was well below expectations.
One of the important lessons to be learned from this example is that companies that raise multiple financing rounds, each with different terms, tend to develop complex capital tables One study, for example, has demonstrated that the original investors would have the incentive to make the optimal longrun value-maximizing investment decisions-or even provide accurate pricing for securities in later financing rounds-only if they are given and maintain a fixed-fraction-of-ownership contract from the outset, so that their equity interest cannot be diluted in the future. 17 Without such a non-dilution contracting provision, it is easy to envision scenarios or circumstances in which the informational asymmetries that exist between the original investors (who are regarded as possessing inside information) and potential new outside investors result in significant underinvestment in follow-on funding rounds.
Another study has shown how staged investments can create conflicts between the initial venture capitalist and the entrepreneur.18 This divergence of interests can take the form of the original investors' incentive to allow or encourage a venture to underperform at the outset, thereby enabling them to fund later-stage rounds themselves at terms that are unfavorable to the entrepreneur-and could even lead to an otherwise viable project being shut down altogether against the entrepreneur's wishes if a better investment opportunity arises. However a more recent study that looked at an admittedly small sample of high-tech VC-funded startups found that VC investors rarely use follow-on funding rounds to dilute the entrepreneurs' ownership interest in the firm.
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What's more, the study also reported that the original investors were more likely to provide "backstop financing" and at higher valuations in situations when it is difficult for the firm to attract new outside investors without providing them with overtly punitive terms.
But despite such evidence of attempts to preserve value through VC contracts, the preceding discussion shows the clear potential for the creation of toxic terms that stem from the incentive conflicts that exist between the participants in a VC transaction. Indeed, the likelihood of such valuetransferring, if not value-reducing, contracting appears to rise with the number of funding rounds that are involved in the deal, which also increases the opaqueness of the overall enterprise as the entire capitalization structure becomes more complex. And once one reaches this level of complexity, it becomes very difficult to design a contract that a disinterested observer-much less all interested parties-will recognize as "optimal." For, as the authors of a recent review of research an entrepreneur and the VC investor is to divide between the interested parties the responsibility for the future risks of the deal, and the ownership of the future cash flows it generates, in a way that is expected to maximize the value of the enterprise.
14 He goes on to note that the present value of the overall enterprise-and specifically how that value is expected to be split between the suppliers and the users of financial capitalis determined by these negotiations.
In that context, Sahlman underscores what he calls a "first principle" of economic contracting: namely, that all financial arrangements can be assigned to one of three categories: (1) those that increase the expected value of the entire endeavor; (2) those that destroy value; and (3) those that serve to transfer value between two or more parties while leaving overall value unchanged. From the current perspective, we label as toxic those financial contracts that either destroy value or transfer value away from parties who may not be aware of their consequences. Further, to the extent that these contracting terms are not transparent and easily understood by everyone involved, they can be viewed as opaque as well.
Complicating any VC negotiation are the agency costs that arise from the fact that the different parties to the transaction have different incentives and motivations. 15 One specific way in which these incentive misalignments can manifest themselves in a private market deal is in the area of staged capital commitments (or what is known in the VC business as "staging"). Sahlman offers a simple example to illustrate the point: Suppose that an entrepreneur would like to raise $20 million for a project that is to be invested over a three-year period. Ideally, she would like to retain 25% ownership in the firm and also receive all of the capital upfront to avoid the uncertainty of future funding rounds. However, it is unlikely that a VC investor would ever agree to this type of structure. Instead, he is likely to insist on a staging arrangement in which the capital is committed in increasing amounts over time and with different terms negotiated at each stage. This sequential approach has become the standard approach to funding new ventures, in large part because it is considered a better way to control for both the risks of the enterprise and the incentives of the entrepreneur.
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But however valuable in limiting risks and providing incentives, staging can also create conflicts between the different parties to a VC transaction, particularly when new outside investors become involved after the initial funding round. note. Bridge loans usually have maturity dates of less than a year, may or may not allow for interest payments, are secured by all of the assets of the company, and are convertible into the equity securities that will be issued once the definitive agreements are executed. These arrangements stand ahead of equity securities in priority and thus offer downside protection in addition to any legal remedies ordinarily available to lenders. But unless and until explicitly converted into equity, these debt agreements do not give lenders the opportunity to participate directly in any appreciation in firm value.
VC firms invest in companies that they believe will provide them with significant capital appreciation and adequate risk protection. To achieve their return objectives, these investors typically consider holding equity securities in either of two basic forms: common stock or preferred stock. Common stockholders are residual claimants in the sense that their claims on the company's cash flow are subordinated to government claims, taxes, pensions and other regulated employee claims, accounts payable, debt payments, and preferred stock.
21 VC investors typically try to avoid investing in common stock because it exposes them to substantial downside risk and also creates a misalignment of incentives with the company's management. Instead, as we will illustrate shortly, some form of preferred stock is often the equity security of choice for private market investors.
Illustrating a Representative Venture Capital Funding Scheme
We now use an example to illustrate how risks and economic benefits are shared among a company's entrepreneurs, employees, and investors. We will make the following assumptions in developing the pre-investment capitalization ("cap") table for Newco Inc., our hypothetical early-stage company. There is a founder, who has invested a total of $2 million in building the firm and owns 800,000 shares of common equity, as well as an employee management team that owns 200,000 shares obtained through previous compensation arrangements. These initial cap positions are summarized in Table 1 . Now suppose that a venture capital firm, VC1, is interested in investing $5 million in Newco at an agreed-upon pre-money valuation (that is, the present value of the existing company before the investment is made) of $15 million. Given the 1.0 million shares of Newco common stock currently outstanding, this pre-money valuation agreement sets the price per share at $15. So, if we assume for the moment that VC1 agrees to make its investment in exchange for common stock, it will acquire a total of 333,333 ($5 million ÷ $15) on VC contracting were forced to conclude, such staged VC investing arrangements are "inherently incomplete contracting solutions." 20 And for this reason, the possibility of designing a value-maximizing VC contract would appear to diminish as increasingly sophisticated clauses are added to later rounds of the staging process.
Furthermore, because it is impossible to observe the intent of the terms included at each stage of a sequential capital funding scheme, the authors go so far as to suggest that conflicts among investors and the resulting "staging behavior" can end up obscuring-if not actually dragging down-the underlying performance of the company. This effect was readily apparent in the Square, Inc. case study described above where the terms intended to attract new investors into the fifth round of private funding (i.e., the ratchet agreement) created an incentive for one class of investors to benefit from a reduction in the value of the enterprise. And it is highly probable that the adversely impacted stakeholders in Square did not even know that such a thing could happen until it actually did.
Venture Capital Transactions: Agreements and Securities
The primary documents that determine the structure of VC investments are the term sheet and the definitive agreements. Term sheets are, for the most part, non-binding agreements between the investors and the company that mark the formalization of negotiations. They provide an outline of the major terms that will be incorporated into the definitive agreements, which are the final contracts that govern the terms and conditions that legally bind the company and the investors in a VC transaction.
A key feature of these agreements is a specification of the securities that will be used in the transaction. There are three types of securities that are typically issued by early-stage companies when raising capital from investors: convertible notes, common stock, and preferred stock. During the capital-raising process, fledgling companies often need to manage their cash balances carefully to ensure that they can continue operating until their financing deal closes, a process that can take several months. Once an investor is identified, it may still take several weeks to negotiate definitive agreements after the term sheet is finalized; and during that time, the entrepreneur may not have sufficient resources to implement his or her operating plan. To provide operating capital to the company during this period, the investor may be willing to offer a "bridge" in the form of a loan secured by a convertible 22. For expositional ease, we have assumed that management received its ownership in the form of penny stock and, therefore, have not included any stock purchase price in calculating its net payout. We will also assume that there are no transaction costs incurred during the sale process. Typically, though, the company would pay investment banking, legal, accounting, due diligence, and other potential fees that can reach up to 10% of the gross proceeds of the sale.
23. Preferred stock agreements usually include terms that require most or all of the preferred shareholders to approve any merger, acquisition, restructuring, or other change of control event. In addition, each round of preferred stock funding can have different rights and privileges, which are set forth in the respective stock purchase agreements.
24. For simplicity, we have assumed here that no preferred stock dividends are payable or have been accrued. 25. If a liquidation event occurs in which the investor's expected payoff {[The percentage ownership into which the preferred can be converted] x [The net proceeds of the transaction]} turns out to be less than the face value of the preferred issue, the preferred stockholders will not exercise their conversion option. They will instead receive a payment up to the amount of the face value of their holding before any distributions can be made to common stockholders. If, on the other hand, these distributable proceeds are greater than the face value, the preferred stockholders will convert. The preferred investors thus have the option to choose whichever payment is greater-their net transaction distributions based on their converted ownership percentage or the face value of the preferred stock.
There are three basic types of preferred stock: redeemable, convertible, and participating convertible. Redeemable preferred stock, often referred to as straight preferred stock, has a face value that the company must repay upon maturity, if it matures at all. In those cases where the redeemable preferred stock is perpetual, the company nearly always retains an option to call the stock whenever prevailing market interest rates decline. Redeemable preferred usually provides a dividend payment and is not convertible into common stock. Any dividend payments can be made in cash or with paid-in-kind ("PIK") shares of preferred stock, and they may be distributed currently or accrued. During their growth stages, venture-backed companies rarely pay cash dividends, which are instead accrued and paid out upon the successful completion of a liquidity event.
If VC1 had invested in redeemable preferred stock in our previous example, it would receive the first $5 million of proceeds from the $10 million acquisition, which would effectively protect the investor against the capital loss incurred by holding common stock.
24 Table 4 displays a payout table assuming that VC1 invests in redeemable preferred stock (and owns 100% of the issue). The founder and management would own the same percentage of common stock as they did before the preferred issuance because the redeemable is not convertible into common, and therefore the common stockholders would not be diluted by an issuance of additional shares. Notice also that although redeemable stock stands in preference to common stockholders and offers some downside risk protection, it does not provide for participation in any increases in company value, which is the main reason why VC investors would rarely, if ever, commit their capital using this form of preferred security.
In contrast, convertible preferred stock, which can be exchanged for common stock at the shareholder's option, gives investors both downside protection and upside potential in the firm. This second form of preferred stock usually also carries a mandatory conversion provision that becomes effective if the company completes a successful IPO exceeding the minimum price and size targets set forth in the definitive agreements.
25 Table 5 extends our example and shows a payout table for the holders of convertible preferred and common stock at two different hypothetical acquisition values for the firm: $10 million and $40 million. If the company receives an acceptable $10 million acquisition offer, the proceeds distributable to the convertible preferred shareholders based on their ownership percentage would be $2.5 million (i.e., 25% of $10 shares. The post-investment cap table, which includes VC1's investment, is shown in Table 2 .
Shortly after VC1 has made its investment, suppose that Newco receives a $10 million acquisition offer for the entire company. The founder and management have a strong economic incentive to accept the offer, which they may well do. However, this sale would create a significant capital loss for VC1, as illustrated in Table 3. 22 Under these terms, the founder and management would receive significant payouts, while VC1 would suffer a $2.5 million loss, representing a -50% return on its initial $5 million investment.
To minimize this risk, VC investors typically demand protection against such a dilutive event before agreeing to commit their financial capital. One way to accomplish this is for VC1 to invest in some form of preferred stock, which provides an ownership position in the company that is senior in priority to common stock holders, but subordinated to the other senior claimants on the firm's cash flows. to exercise their option to convert into common stock and receive a payout of $10 million instead of the $5 million face value payout they would get if they did not convert. Participating convertible preferred stock ("PCPS"), the third type of preferred equity position, gives investors a preference payment and a payout tied to their percentage of net proceeds. There is usually a mandatory conversion upon the completion of a successful IPO or with an affirmative vote million). In this case, the holders of the convertible preferred would not convert because, by so doing, they would receive less than the face value (i.e., $5 million) of the securities to which they would otherwise be entitled. If, on the other hand, the company received an acceptable $40 million offer, the proceeds distributable to the holders of the convertible preferred would be $10 million (i.e., 25% of $40 million). Of course, the convertible preferred holders would clearly want 27. Typically, the most logical source of capital for the new funding round would be from the previous investors (i.e., VC1 in this example). However, there are a number of practical reasons why VC1 might not be the first to offer funding for this follow-on round, including the available capital (i.e., "dry powder") it has, its existing investment rights, policy-level commitment restrictions it faces, relationships with other existing investors, or any of several other deal-specific characteristics. Under these circumstances, it is likely that existing investors such as VC1 might help to identify new potential investors.
28. The net proceeds from the sale represent the amount of cash distributable to shareholders after investment banking, legal, diligence, and any other transaction costs are paid, as well as any taxes, compensation, or other payables agreed to in the definitive agreements.
layer of complexity to our earlier example, here we introduce a new potential investor, VC2, that is different than the one that funded the Series A round (VC1). In this case, VC2's $20 million Preferred investment is convertible into 40% of the outstanding and reserved common stock of the firm. With VC2's investment, the post-money valuation of the firm after the Series B round is $50 million.
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Liquidation Preferences and Conversion Rights
After the negotiated value and share price, liquidation preferences often have the most significant impact on the allocation of risk and cash flows in any VC deal. Liquidation preferences are specified as a multiple of the investor's committed capital and determine the order in which the company's shareholders will receive cash flow distributions upon the sale or liquidation of the company. For example, in the case of convertible preferred stock, a "one times liquidation preference" would give holders the election right to receive an amount equal to the greater of one times their initial investment before any payments are made to the common stockholders, or a distribution equal to their percentage ownership in the company multiplied by the sale proceeds. In addition, if the preferred shareholders are scheduled to receive PIK payments, they would also get a preference payment equal to amount of dividends that have accumulated. PIK dividends further dilute the pre-Series B shareholders and can produce additional preferences that must be paid before other shareholders receive distributions Liquidation preferences are frequently pooled among all classes of preferred stock, with distributions made in proportion to their preferred investments. At times, however, a class of preferred shareholders may require that their preferences be paid before payments to any other shareholders (i.e., "superpriority"). Any remaining proceeds would then be distributed to other preferred shareholders possessing preferences and, only after that, to the common shareholders. Table 7 extends the payout analysis in Table 6 to include the Series B preferred stock described previously. We will also assume that the Preferred A and B series securities have the right to receive 6% PIK dividend payments, and have pooled, one times, preference payments. Also, Newco is assumed to be sold for $100 million four years after the Series A investment and two years after the Series B round.
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In the top panel of Table 7 , the investors hold convertible preferred stock, which they will convert into common shares if their proportion of distributable proceeds is greater than their preference payment. In the example, we assume that of a majority of the preferred stockholders. Upon the sale of the company, the holders of PCPS receive a preference payment equal to the face value of the preferred stock and any dividends that are accrued but unpaid. The PCPS then converts into common shares and participates on a pro rata basis in any net sales proceeds distributed to equity holders. Table 6 shows a payout table for the holders of PCPS and common stock, once again assuming potential acquisition values of $10 million or $40 million. If the company receives a $10 million acquisition offer, the proceeds distributable to the holders of the PCPS would be $6.25 million, which equals (i) the preference payment of $5 million, plus (ii) 25% multiplied by the distributable proceeds of $5 million (i.e., the $10 million acquisition offer minus the preference payment of $5 million). With the $40 million offer, however, PCPS investors would receive $13.75 million, or their preference payment of $5 million plus their percentage, 25%, of the distributable proceeds of $35 million. In general, past research has established that VC firms require greater cash flow rights when there are greater internal and external risks to the firm's success. 26 So, for example, when exit markets are volatile VCs will be more likely to require the additional protections provided by PCPS.
Multiple Funding Rounds and Risk-Shifting Contracting Terms
As noted previously, term sheets form the foundation upon which the definitive agreements are developed. Because of their importance, we will review the key term sheet provisions that are designed to protect potential new investors against downside outcomes, regardless of whether that reduction in company value results from poor managerial decision-making or a general market decline. In particular, we focus our discussion on those terms that have the greatest impact on the allocation of risks and cash flows among managers, employees, current investors, and prospective investors in multi-stage capital-raising transactions. Most important among such terms and conditions are those that govern the following: (1) liquidation preferences and conversion rights, (2) anti-dilution provisions, and (3) options to distribute new shares.
To show the potential effects of these contracting devices, we extend our previous analysis by assuming that Newco can raise a Series B Preferred round of financing at a pre-money valuation of $30 million, which represents a 50% increase from the $20 million post-money valuation of the Series A Preferred round illustrated in Table 2 . To introduce another "reset") to the current lower price. Under a weighted average ratchet, the price would be adjusted to an average of the two prices weighted by the amount of capital raised in each round.
To illustrate the impact of ratchets, we now assume that Newco has raised a $10 million Series B round of capital but at a post-money valuation of $25 million instead of $50 million, which provides the Series B investors the same 40 percent ownership as in the previous example. The Series B funding would thus be a down round, because the pre-money valuation of $15 million is less than the $20 million postmoney valuation in the Series A round. The effects of the full and weighted average ratchets are presented in Table 8 .
If there is no ratchet, each of the existing shareholders-VC1, founder, and management-has their ownership interests diluted equally by 40%, which is the percentage of the company that the Series B investor, VC2, purchases. So, whether there is anti-dilution protection or not, VC2 receives 40% ownership in the company. With a full ratchet, VC1's ownership position is protected against dilution by the retroactive adjustment in the conversion price into which it will be converted into common stock. VC1's ownership therefore remains at 25%, or approximately two-thirds greater than the 15% of the company it would own had it not received full ratchet protection. In that case, the founder and management will bear the full burden of the dilution and each suffers a decline in their percentage ownership of more than 53%, as compared to the 40% decline that would have occurred without the full ratchet. The founder's ownership, for example, declined from 60% to 28%; but, more importantly, it is lower (28% instead of 36%) than it would be absent the ratchet. And this means that the investor's antithe distributable proceeds for the Series B shareholder (i.e., VC2) are $41.3 million while their preference payment would be only $22.4 million. The Series A distribution and preference payments for VC1 are $17.2 million and $6.2 million, respectively.
In the lower panel of the table, the preferred shareholders are assumed to own participating convertible preferred stock for which they receive their preference payments and then their proportional distribution of the remaining proceeds. The distributions for the Series B and Series A investors in this case are $51.9 million and $18.5 million, respectively, which represent increases of $10.6 million and $1.3 million compared with the situation in which VC2 and VC1 held convertible preferred stock and received either their preference payment or proportional distribution, but not both. The total increase in payments to the preferred shareholders in the lower panel is $11.9 million, or more than 20%, and is exactly offset by the decrease in the payments to the founders, management, and option holders. So, as this example shows, a change in the liquidation preferences can result in significant transfers of wealth from founders, employees, and early VCs to new investors.
Anti-Dilution Provisions
Anti-dilution provisions, or ratchets, are intended to protect investors against share price declines that occur during either subsequent fundraising rounds or an IPO. If a ratchet is triggered, the ratio at which the preferred stock is converted into common is adjusted to reflect the new price on either a full basis or a weighted average basis. Under a full ratchet, the price of the shares with protection is essentially reduced (i.e. will see their ownership interest diluted but the new investors will not. Alternatively, if the new capital round is closed before the option pool is established, all shareholders will be diluted proportionally. Term sheets also often require founders and existing management to vest the shares or options that they already own, and they include provisions allowing the company to repurchase the shares owned by management-vested or not vested-when a manager leaves the company. In the Appendix, we illustrate the potentially significant impact of these provisions and how they can represent a significant wealth transfer from management to shareholders.
When Contracting Terms Become Collectively Toxic
We have examined the risk-shifting contract provisions often included in VC term sheets with a focus on those that have the greatest impact on the allocation of ownership, risk, and cash flows. So far, we have considered these effects in isolation from one another. In the multi-stage investment process that dominates the VC market, though, the cumulative and interactive effect of these contracting terms can alter the allocation of cash flows in unexpected ways that are often very difficult to understand and can unexpectedly transfer or destroy wealth for some or all of the company's stakeholders. Accordingly, we conclude our analysis with a consideration of the cumulative effect of these terms. Table 9 extends the example presented in Table 8 and assumes that Newco is sold for $27 million six years after the Series A round was closed and four years after the Series dilution provision reduced the founder's and management's ownership interests by more than 22%.
If VC1 had received weighted average ratchet protection in the Series A round, it would incur a portion of the dilutive impact of a down Series B round, but the founder and management would still bear the bulk of the dilution. VC1's ownership would decline from 25% to just under 21%, but that is still nearly 44% higher than what would happen without the weighted average ratchet. The founder's ownership declines from 60% to about 31.5%, which is 12.4% less than it would be without any ratchet, but 12.5% greater than under the full ratchet. Once again, however, the important point to recognize is that the existence of this contracting term resulted in the potential wealth transfer from the management and employees of the firm to the investors who had the ratchet protection.
Option Pool Shares and Repurchase Rights
Two other term sheet provisions that impact the allocation of shares among the investors, the founders, and the management are the determination of how option shares are allocated and the company's right to repurchase shares from management. The shares allocated to an option pool, which is intended to provide incentives to employees by allowing them to participate in any increases in firm value, are furnished by the company either before or after the new investment round is closed. The impact of this difference in timing on share price and ownership can be dramatic. If the pool is established with pre-closing shares, the existing shareholders (2015), op cit. 30. The partner at one of the venture firms that had submitted a participating convertible preferred term sheet said that he would "die in a ditch" before he would give up the participation right.
also signal other employees, who are unlikely to have access to the investment agreements as well, that the economic benefits they hoped would flow to them in the successful sale of the company may be less than expected.
The Contracting Terms Used in Practice
How prevalent are these opaque and toxic terms in VC funding contracts? The law firm of Fenwick & West reviewed the terms from 37 venture-backed U.S. companies that raised capital at valuations of $1 billion or more during the 12-month period ending March 31, 2015.
29 They found that all of the 37 companies provided their VCs with liquidation preferences over common stock, and that 19% of them had at least one series of preferred stock funding with senior liquidation protection over other investors. The study also documented that 30% of the firms used some type of IPO protection terms, with 16% of them requiring that the IPO price be no less than the implied valuation of the current investment round while 14% offered an IPO-linked ratchet in which the company would provide additional shares to investors if the IPO price fell below the investment round price. Finally, although none of the companies provided full rachet protection, every company in the sample provided weighted average protection.
Because the Fenwick & West sample is small and includes only large private firms, or unicorns, we should be careful about generalizing these findings about the terms included in venture-backed financing rounds. Also, it is apparent that the terms negotiated into these contracts are highly dependent on capital market conditions. Our discussions with investment bankers, VC partners, and private company managers indicate that investors tend to ask for-and are typically granted-more protective terms when companies are small and have unproven business models, or when the IPO and acquisition markets are less active, making successful exit opportunities more uncertain. One banker we spoke with, for instance, was in the process of raising a later-stage round for a company that generated more than $30 million in revenue and was breaking even on a cash flow basis. The firm received multiple terms sheets from prospective investors, all of which required a full ratchet and participating convertible preferred.
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What Can Be Done? In sum, the widespread reliance on risk protection for investors in VC contracts, in combination with their complexity and opaqueness, contains the potential for transfers of wealth from founders and management-transfers that, if significant enough, could end up reducing the incentives for entrepreneurs to form new businesses. And to the extent that happens, VCs could end up being the losers as well as the enterprises B round. Further, we suppose the Series A and B investors received participating convertible preferred stock with full ratchet protection and a 6% cumulative PIK dividend. The exhibit also shows the payoffs that would go to the founders and management.
Recall that before Newco raised its Series A round, the founders owned 80% of the equity and management held the other 20%. Upon the sale of the company, however, they will receive gross payouts of $1,919,156 and $479,789, respectively, or 7.11% and 1.78% of total proceeds. In addition, since the founders committed $2 million in initial capital, they have a net loss of $80,844, even though the company sold for more than the $25 million post-money valuation of the Series B round.
If the Series A and Series B securities were instead structured as convertible preferred shares with no ratchet protection, the payouts to the original stakeholders in the firm would differ significantly. As shown in last two columns of Table 9 , the founders would have received a gross payout of more than $6.6 million-or a net payout in excess of $4.6 million-while management would have received over $1.6 million. The additional proceeds paid to the founders and management exactly offset the decrease in the payouts to the investors, VC1 and VC2.
Many entrepreneurs fail to consider the combined effect that preferences and ratchets can have when estimating the payment they will receive even from a successful exit. Further, managers and other option-holding employees are unlikely to have even been shown the terms sheets or definitive agreements and so would have no way of knowing what protections the company has granted investors or how to determine the value of their options.
The rights of preferred stockholders may not only transfer wealth, as we have illustrated throughout this study, but can also destroy wealth in several ways, such as by creating conflicts among investors that delay future fundraisings, causing distractions for management, or diminishing managers' incentives to remain with the firm. If, for example, managers are able to develop a "waterfall" analysis-estimates of the cash flow payments to all stakeholders at various company sale prices-that takes into account the cumulative interaction of the terms from all previous funding rounds, they may determine that they are unlikely to receive a meaningful payout upon a successful exit, which in turn could cause them to leave the firm for more attractive employment opportunities. Of course, the loss of key managers can destroy firm value, especially in the case of early stage-venture backed companies whose fortunes depend heavily on the quality of the management team and its ability to execute the company's strategic plan. The loss of key managers may 31. But there are disadvantages to the creation of new options, particularly for founders. Specifically, the options will have an exercise price that actually must be paid to acquire stock, which then must be held for at least one year to receive the beneficial capital gains tax treatment for founding shares.
32. For clarity, we have assumed that the Series A investor decided not to exercise any reinvestment right that it might have had to participate in the Series B round.
33. We also assume that the option agreements allow for net exercise, which permits the option holders to, upon the sale of the company, receive the difference between the stock price and the exercise price upon exercise.
Concluding Thoughts
In this paper, we have described VC contracting terms frequently used in practice and illustrated how those terms can very quickly become opaque to some or all of the company stakeholders. We argued that the degree of difficulty in understanding the full implications of how investor protections such as preference payment agreements and ratchets rises dramatically with the sort of multi-stage financing typical in VC transactions. More important, the cumulative impact of these financing terms can easily result in unforeseen wealth transfers between company stakeholders, and can even destroy value in the overall enterprise by creating conflicts among investors or distorting management and employee incentives. It is in that sense that these contracting terms can be regarded as toxic.
Venture capital firms are an important component of the capital markets because they provide the investment funds and expertise to help entrepreneurs grow their companies. They are also experts at negotiating term sheets, whereas entrepreneurs are likely to have limited if any experience in accessing the capital markets. Of course, there will always be significant pressure on entrepreneurs to raise funds, even with restrictive terms, because they need the capital to operate their companies. But, as we have seen, both investors and entrepreneurs alike should be cautious when negotiating funding agreements and develop a thorough understanding of the contracting terms to which they are committing themselves, and the ways in which such terms can affect not only the value of their own investments, but the performance and value of the enterprise. that would then be forced to find alternative opportunities to deploy their financial capital. But are there steps that both entrepreneurs and VCs can take to anticipate and contain the damage caused by these potentially toxic contracts?
In fact, the negative effects imposed by such downside investor protections can be limited through a number of contracting measures that can either be included in the term sheet, or negotiated once the effect of the contracting terms becomes evident. For example, one straightforward way to reduce the adverse impact of preferences would be to put caps on the preference payments, or to eliminate those payments upon the achievement of certain operating objectives. In practice, because these caps usually apply to all potential payments, they would require the approval of prior investors. Ratchets can also be capped or reduced upon the achievement of performance milestones.
What's more, the effects of badly designed contracts might also be amended after the fact. For example, if a waterfall analysis reveals that the economic outcome for management may be severely impaired by existing investment agreements, the board could, with the consent of the investors, take a variety of actions, including the creation of a bonus plan (known as a "carve out") to provide financial incentives for management or the enlargement of the option pool combined with the issuance of new options (a practice called "regreening"). Carve outs, however, usually provide benefits only for senior managers and may not help other key employees. But regreenings can help restore some of the percentage ownership of employees as well as founders who may have been impaired after a financing round.
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For instance, in an earlier example, we told of a CEO-founder of a company who had his ownership diluted from more than 35.0% to 0.7% because of the ratchet protection granted to investors in a succession of funding rounds. The CEO was regreened with a new option grant that increased his ownership back to 5.0 percent. Nevertheless, he left the firm shortly thereafter because his ownership had significantly declined and the options he had been issued carried an exercise price equal to the company's stock price at the close of the Series B round, which made it likely that they would receive less advantageous ordinary income tax treatment. So, although after-the-fact adjustments can certainly help a situation, they are not necessarily perfect solutions.
34. If unexercised options are returned to the pool, then the ownership of all investors will increase pro rata. The ownership percentage of the Series B investors in our example will, therefore, increase even if the option pool was established before the Series B round was closed.
35. Vesting is the process by which employees receive the right to exercise a portion of the options issued to them or to receive their ownership rights in existing shares.
36. For expositional ease, we have assumed that the fair market value of the common stock is the Series B price of $18.75. The board, however, would likely argue that the value of the common shares is lower than that of the preferred issue, because of the preferences and other rights granted to the latter. The actual repurchase share price would, therefore, likely be lower than $18.75, which increases the likelihood that the shares will be repurchased.
employees will be 36.0%, 13.5%, 32.4%, and 8.1%, respectively, each of which is 10% lower than it would have been without the option pool in place.
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Term sheets also include vesting schedules for both newly issued options and, in many cases, for the existing shares owned by the founders and management. 35 Founders are often surprised that investors may require them to vest the shares they already own, which is more typical during early capital-raising rounds when the company is still in its initial development stages and the management team may be less experienced. In our example, the founder owns 30% of the company's fully diluted shares, as shown in Table 10 . If we assume that there are actually two founders who own equal shares, then each founder would own 15% of the company's stock. Requiring founders to vest their ownership can mitigate the free-rider problem that can arise if one of them decides to leave after a capital round is raised. The company can repurchase the exiting founder's shares, which reduces the total number of shares outstanding, increases the percentage ownership of all shareholders, and generates shares that can be used for incentive grants to attract new management. Table 12 illustrates this repurchase right when a founder either leaves voluntarily, is removed with cause, or is removed without cause. If, for example, one of the founders leaves voluntarily, the company often has the right to repurchase the vested shares at fair market value and the unvested shares at cost. So, in this example, he or she has 100,000 vested shares that the company may repurchase at $18.75 per share (as shown in Table 10 ) for a total of $1.875 million, and 300,000 unvested shares that it may repurchase at $0.01 per share for a total of $3,000. 36 The company is unlikely to exercise its right to repurchase the vested shares but is very likely to repurchase the unvested shares. If the founder is removed for cause, all 400,000 shares will likely be repurchased by the company at $0.01 per share for a total payment of $4,000. Founders removed without cause, however, usually retain their vested shares and the unvested shares may often be repurchased at fair market value, leaving them with shares or cash valued at $7.5 million, depending upon whether the company exercises its right. Thus, the founders' employment agreements materially impact the value of the company repurchase right because they set forth the definitions of removal either with or without cause. As Table 12 indicates, a founder receives considerably less value if deemed to have been removed with cause and that represents a wealth transfer from management to shareholders.
Appendix
Two other term sheet provisions that impact the allocation of shares among the investors, the founders, and the management are the allocation of option shares and the company's right to repurchase shares from management. As we noted, an important consideration in structuring an option pool is whether the shares are furnished by the company either before or after the new investment round is closed. To see this, consider Table 10 , which shows Newco's -the hypothetical firm from our previous examples-capitalization table from before the Series A investment through the closing of the Series B round. The post-money valuation after the Series A round was $20 million, which consisted of $15 million pre-money plus a $5 million investment. Here, we once again assume that the post-money valuation of the Series B round is set at its original level of $50 million, which would imply that the pre-money valuation would be $30 million (the $50 million post-money valuation minus a $20 million investment). 32 The value of the company thus increased 50% from a Series A post-money valuation of $20 million to a Series B pre-money valuation of $30 million. Accordingly, the implied stock price should increase from the $15.00 Series A level to $22.50.
But, as reported in Table 10 , the Series B price turns out to be only $18.75, or about 17% lower than expected, because the nearly 270,000 option shares must be set aside before VC2 commits its funds and receives 40% of the company's postclosing shares on a fully diluted basis. 33 The option shares, therefore, dilute the existing shareholders before the Series B investment is made. This valuation impact can be expressed as follows: Pre-money Valuation = Post-money ValuationValue of Option Shares -New Investment. After the adoption of this term in the new funding agreement, the old owners-VC1, the firm founder, and the firm employees-will hold 12.5%, 30.0%, and 7.5%, respectively, of the fully diluted ownership.
By contrast, Table 11 shows a comparable cap table under the assumption that the option pool is established after the round is completed. In this case, the post-funding share price is $22.50 and, at closing, VC2 will once again receive 40% of the company's fully diluted shares outstanding. The 10% option pool is then established, and dilutes all shareholders equally by 10% of their pre-option pool ownership. The resulting stock price would be $20.25, or 10% less than the Series B closing price of $22.50. And the post-option pool ownership percentages for VC2, VC1, the founder, and the 
